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20220607112352.0 |
020 |
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|a9780199218738
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040 |
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|aStDuBDS|cStDuBDS|dNOU
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050 |
4
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|aBD171|b.L987 2009
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100 |
1
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|aLynch, Michael P.|q(Michael Patrick),|d1966-
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245 |
10
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|aTruth as one and many|h[electronic resource] /|cMichael P. Lynch.
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260 |
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|aOxford :|bOxford University Press,|cc2009.
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300 |
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|ax, 205 p. ;|c23 cm.
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440 |
0
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|aOxford Scholarship Online
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504 |
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|aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
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520 |
8
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|aWhat is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
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533 |
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|aElectronic reproduction.|bOxford :|cOxford University Press,|d2009.|f(Oxford Scholarship Online).|nMode of access: World Wide Web. System requirements: Internet Explorer 6.0 (or higher) or Firefox 2.0 (or higher).|nAvailable as searchable text in HTML format.|nAccess restricted to subscribing institutions.
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650 |
0
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|aTruth.
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809 |
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|pEB|dBD171|e.L987|y2009
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856 |
40
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|uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001
|